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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines civilian oversight of the police in
the

50

largest

U.

S.

cities.

Data

on

the

nature

and

organization of civilian oversight was collected via phone
surveys.

Local mandates on civilian oversight were obtained

through mailed-in responses (i.e., statutes, ordinances, and
annual reports).
The present
prevalence,
police.

A

research

trends,

was

utilized

to

determine

the

and variety of civilian review of the

classification

schemata

was

developed

which

categorized civilian oversight agencies into one of three
classes.

Pursuant to this research, it was discovered that

the majority (60%) of the 50 largest cities have some form of
civilian review.

Based on the findings, results were combined

to show generalities among civilian oversight agencies, while
simultaneously detailing other differences specific to these
agencies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Statement of Problem

The

problem

addressed

by

this

thesis

concerns

the

prevalence and variety of civilian oversight agencies in the
United States.
system

which

This thesis
permits

establishes a classification

meaningful

oversight of the police.

evaluation

of

civilian

By focusing on civilian oversight

agencies in the 50 largest U. S. cities, prevalence, variety,
and trends can be discussed with more clarity.
Research Question.

How prevalent are civilian oversight
agencies in the United States, and
how can they be distinguished from
one another?

Definition of Terms

Much confusion exists concerning the terminology used in
discussing

civilian

"civilian

oversight"

oversight.
and

Throughout

"civilian

review"

this
will

thesis
be

used

interchangeablely. vCivilian oversight refers to any procedure
whereby

a non-sworn individual or a body consisting of non

sworn individuals investigate and/or review allegations of
police misconduct and make subsequent recommendations.

An

"independent" investigation or review refers to procedures
conducted by civilians not responsible to the police agency;
this type of review is most commonly called "external" review.

Therefore, "internal" review refers to procedures where sworn
officers conduct reviewing processes.
External review of the police is a direct response to a
perception of continuing police misconduct.

Proponents of

civilian review question the internal mechanisms that have
been the traditional forum for handling police misconduct
cases

(President's

Commission on Law Enforcement

Administration of Justice, 1967).

and the

Civilian oversight agencies

have been proposed as one possible alternative to curbing
police abuses.
Research Objective

To date, research in the field of criminal justice has
failed

to

provide

an

adequate

oversight of the police.
notable

attempt

(Kerstetter,

to

1985),

understanding

of

civilian

Although there has been at least one
develop

many

a

classification

questions

remain

system

unanswered—

questions that must be answered before researchers can explain
the dramatic growth in the area of civilian oversight during
the last decade.
work,

evidence

These questions concern the nature of police
of police misconduct,

and

recommendations

offered to increase police efficiency.
Since 60 percent of the 50 largest U. S. cities have a
civilian oversight agency of some variety, much can be learned
by comparing these agencies.

Developing a classification

system that is all-inclusive is the first step in discussing
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civilian

oversight

in

an

informed

manner.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a descriptive
analysis of civilian oversight agencies in the 50 largest
U. S. cities.

Civilian oversight agencies will be designated

as being in one of the three classifications this thesis will
establish.

Differences in oversight agencies will then be

discussed respective to the different classes and comparisons
will

be

made

(e.g.,

method

of

appointment,

enabling

authorization, types of cases reviewed, etc.).
The significance of this research will be to provide a
foundation for studying civilian oversight agencies in a more
systematic

and comprehensive manner.

Data will

also be

outlined concerning the general characteristics of cities
where oversight agencies exist. Factors such as the population
of the city, the racial composition of the city, the policecitizen

ratio,

and

the

geographical

location

of

the

city/agency will be compared across the cities in the sample.
Systematic

data

to

be

outlined

may

aid

researchers

and

scholars in answering some of the more qualitative questions
concerning civilian oversight,
civilian

oversight

agencies

controlling police misconduct,

questions such as,
effective

(a) are

mechanisms

for

(b) how do we evaluate the

effectiveness of civilian oversight organizations, and (c) are
civilian oversight agencies aimed primarily at controlling

4

police misconduct or at restoring public confidence in the
police?

5

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction

Since civilian review of the police is a response to
police misconduct, to understand police misconduct,

first,

police behavior must be placed in the context of routine
police duties.
reviewed

from

Second, the citizen complaints system must be
a

historical

perspective,

detailing

the

specifics by which traditional complaint systems have become
subject to great criticism.

Three key questions must be

addressed in this review concerning the emergence of civilian
review of the police:

(1) what is the true nature of police

work; (2) what evidence is there of police misconduct; and (3)
why has the traditional citizen complaint system for handling
complaints of citizens become subject to criticism?
Police Work and Behavior

The commonly used motto that the police are "to serve and
to protect" does little to define the true nature of police
work.

The above phrase suggests that police work can be

neatly put into two rather broad categories.

According to

Reiss (1971), law enforcement officers are required to handle
a wide range of problems that arise in the everyday lives of
citizens in any given community.

Police researchers have

primarily used calls for police service and observations of

6

police on patrol in order to analyze what police do on the job
(Reiss,

1971?

National

Institute

of

Justice,

1984) . In

discussing the nature of police work utilizing service calls
and actual patrol observations, two crucial areas of interest
can be addressed— citizen expectations

of the police

and

police behavior on the streets.
In The Police and the Public. Albert Reiss (1971) made
the first systematic attempt to describe the nature of police
work in America.

Reiss examined 6,172 calls for service

received in a 24-hour period at the Chicago Police Department
in April
service
matters,

of 1966.
into

Reiss then categorized the calls

four broad

request

categories

for assistance,

(request

complaints

on

for

criminal

about

police

service, and police information calls) (p. 71).
Reiss used actual observations of officers on patrol in
Washington, DC, Boston, and Chicago in the summer of 1966.
a seven week period,

hired observers

In

reported on 5,3 60

mobilizations of the police (police mobilizations refer to any
time an officer was dispatched to a situation or when the
officer himself initiated an encounter with a citizen) (Reiss,
1971? p. xiii). Thirty-six observers were divided equally to
high crime precincts in Boston, Washington DC, and Chicago.
The primary purpose of Reiss1 study was to uncover the true
nature of police work— what did police actually do on a daily
basis while patrolling (Reiss, 1973? p. 12)?
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While citizens defined the majority of their complaints
as criminal in nature, the patrol observations made by Reiss
suggested that most police-citizen encounters involved non
criminal matters, incidents in which police personnel observed
no clear violation of the law.

Reiss discovered that around

80 percent of incidents responded to by the Chicago Police
Department involved such things as requests for information,
medical

assistance,

reports

of

traffic

hazards,

missing

persons reports, and unsatisfactory police performance. Also,
various administrative functions accounted for police activity
on patrol (Reiss, 1971; p. 71).
The contrast between what citizens regard as criminal and
what

the police

regard

as criminal

presents problems

interpreting the nature of police work (Reiss, 1971).

in

Three

factors that may explain some of the disagreement involve
citizens* often-vague understanding of what is criminal and
what is not, the great degree of police discretion in policecitizen encounters,
ultimately

labels

differences

of

and the fact that the police officer
the

what

encounter.
is

Given

perceived

to

proportion of criminal to non-criminal
slightly more

equal,

but

clearly,

be

the

preceding

criminal,

the

encounters may be

the police

role

as

a

"peacekeeper" outweighs the "crimefighter role" (Reiss, 1971).
Reiss
involved

(1971)
reactive,

found that the majority of police work
as

opposed

to

proactive

policing.

Proactive policing refers to the occasion when the policeman
himself initiates the contact with a citizen.

Around 80

percent of all policing was found to be reactive with the
officer being summoned to the location usually by telephone or
dispatch and less often by police initiated contacts (p. 71) .
The Police Services Study (PSS), conducted from 1974-80,
was a replication of Reiss' work.

It incorporated important

changes in methodology that make the PSS a much more reliable
research endeavor.

Twenty-one different police departments in

three metropolitan areas were observed during the PSS.
twenty-one

departments

covered

a wide variety

of

The

police

organizations, including urban and rural, high crime and low
crime areas, small and large populated areas, and areas with
various income levels (National Institute of Justice, 1984; p.
177) .
As in Reiss' research, trained observers were distributed
across

selected

cities.

The

PSS

utilized

over

60

neighborhoods in 21 different cities, whereas Reiss had used
nine high crime areas in three heavily populated cities.
Altogether

the

PSS

used

5,688

police-citizen

involving more than 10,000 citizens.

encounters

Nine-hundred shifts were

observed and 650 variables were recorded (e.g., how encounter
was initiated,

location of incident, police response time,

length of encounter, police/citizen actions and demeanor, etc)
(National

Institute of Justice,

1984?

p.

177).

The PSS

represents the most extensive study to-date of police services
in America.
The PSS contained more than just the two sources of data
mentioned.

Phase I of the project was a census of all law

enforcement agencies in the United States (local, state, and
federal). Phase II of the project

utilized police calls for

service and observations of police patrol. Additional sources
of

data

included:

officers,

1)

in-person

supervisors,

and

interviews

administrators?

with
2)

police

in-depth

interviews with police administrators; 3) personal interviews
with representatives of citizen organizations; 4) interviews
with

public

officials;

5)

personal

interviews

with

representatives of citizen organizations; 6) interviews with
public officials involved in public policy-making? and, 7)
surveys

of

neighborhood

Justice,

1984? p. 178).

focuses

on

calls

for

residents

(National

Institute

of

The reported findings of the PSS
service

and

patrol

observations.

Thirteen categories of calls for service were established.
The categories were as follows:
(a)

Non-violent crime— non-personal injury or property
loss;

(b)

Traffic problem— dangerous or illegal operation of
a motor vehicle, motor vehicle accident, or public
hazard;

(c)

Assistance— all situations other than the above
where citizen requests or appears in need of help?
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(d)

Public
nuisance— unpleasant
circumstances ?

(e)

General informational request;

(f)

Interpersonal conflict— persons involved in a
dispute? violence may be present but no criminal
liability is evident?

(g)

Suspicious circumstances— circumstances about which
there is great uncertainty, but threatening?

(h)

Medical problem— injured or ill persons in need of
help ?

(i)

Dependent person— persons
themselves;

(j)

Violent crime— bodily injury or threat
cases involving criminal liability?

(k)

Information
for
police— persons
providing
information concerning crime or other problems;

(1)

Public morals crime— an affront to legal standards?
and,

(m)

Internal police operations— no direct service to
citizen (e.g., administrative tasks, internal legal
procedures) (National Institute of Justice, 198? p.
28) .

unable

Despite the differences in methodology,

or

to

the

annoying

care

for

thereof?

PSS data

confirmed most of the findings on the nature of police work
provided

by Reiss'

Justice, 1984).

earlier

study

(National Institute

of

Data from the PSS revealed that police work

was primarily reactive as opposed to proactive and that most
police encounters involved matters of a noncriminal nature.
A breakdown of calls for service by the different categories
reflected the following percentages of all calls for service
in the 21 different police departments:

1) violent crimes— 2

11

percent,

2) non-violent crimes— 17 percent,

conflicts— 7 percent,

3) interpersonal

4) medical assistance— 3 percent,

5)

traffic problems— 9 percent, 6) dependent persons— 3 percent,
7) public nuisances— 11 percent, 8) suspicious circumstances—
5 percent, 9) assistance— 12 percent, 10) citizen request for
information— 21 percent, 11) citizen providing information— 8
percent,

and

12)

internal

operations

requests— 2 percent

(National Institute of Justice, 1984; p.28).
Data from both the PSS and Reiss' observations converge
on the nature of police work.

It seems that police duties, by

and large, have little to do with actual crime fighting, but
they are expected to do a wide variety of functions where they
are in constant contact with citizens.

This contact with the

community can cause special problems where, in some instances,
the police may act inappropriately.
paper

will

deal

with

research

The next section of this
in

the

area

of

police

misconduct.
Police Misconduct

With regard to Reiss' study, observers were specifically
asked to report on each instance of police use of force and to
categorize it as necessary or unnecessary.

Minor incidents

that involved simple restraint, such as holding an offender's
arm down were excluded from analysis.

Reiss included only

cases where a policeman struck a suspect with his hands, fist,
feet, body, or when he used a weapon of some type (Reiss,
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1973; p. 12).

Force used against an individual by an officer

was labeled unnecessary if it was used in one of the following
methods:
1)

If the officer struck a
didn't effect an arrest?

2)

where the individual involved, by word or
deed, offered no resistance?

3)

where the officer, facing some resistance,
could have attempted to control the situation
in an alternate manner short of physical
force?

4)

where other officers were present
could have rendered assistance?

5)

where the individual was handcuffed and
made no attempt to resist or flee? and,

6)

where the citizen resisted but the use of
force continued after the situation was under
control (Reiss, 1973? p. 12).

Patrol

observations

citizen

and

and

from the three cities

cited 37

instances where force had been judged unnecessary based on the
six criteria established.

Data revealed that the police had

used unnecessary force against 44 citizens (in some instances
force was used against more than one citizen during a police
encounter) .

Furthermore, no one was arrested in 15 of the

cases, and of these cases eight involved encounters where no
physical or verbal resistance was indicated (Reiss, 197 3; p.
12).

Observers

reported

in detail

on

11,255

encounters

involving citizens in one of the three cities. Reiss reported
that

the actualinstances

where

police

officers

used
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unnecessary force in all three cities were relatively low in
proportion to the total number of encounters daily; only about
3 encounters in every 1,000 involved the use of unnecessary
force

nevertheless,

police

misconduct constituted a real problem in policing

(Reiss,

1973;

(Reiss,

1971;

170).

p.

Reiss

142),

but

concluded

that

police

misconduct

constituted a more substantial problem due to the fact that
complaints tend to accumulate over time. Misconduct directed
toward citizens in this sense may become considerable
volume when observing annual rates.
Reiss'

study

of misconduct

in

(Reiss, 1971; p. 170).

had

certain

limitations.

First, he only used one police department (Chicago) in his
observations of calls for police service.

It could very well

be

was

that

the

Chicago

Police

Department

significantly

different from other departments in the way service calls were
handled.

Secondly, Reiss observed calls for a 24-hour period,

a longer observation period could have affected his results.
Finally by choosing high crime areas in each of the three
cities, Reiss may have provided a non-representative picture
of police-citizen encounters.

Certainly high crime areas in

themselves would greatly affect the potential for officers to
become

engaged

in

particularly

violent

encounters

with

citizens, especially since these high crime areas in the three
cities were places where racial riots and disturbances caused
additional negative confrontations between the police and the

public.

On the positive side, Reiss* observations provide a

rich body
police.
services

of

information on citizen

expectations

of the

Citizens expect the police to provide a variety of
that

have

little

to

do

with

crime-fighting.

Additionally, Reiss* research confirms that police officers do
not always act within the confines of the law (Reiss, 1971; p.
156) .
Both the Kerner Commission (1968) and the President*s
Crime Commission (1967) as well as various other researchers
have clearly noted special problems with police-community
relations in large urban areas (Reiss, 1971? Chevigny, 1969).
Chevigny
City.

(19 69) studied police abuse of force in New York
Chevigny

found

that

55

percent

of

all

citizen

complaints alleging excessive force involved defiance of some
variety on the part of the citizen.

Chevigny1s study revealed

that nearly all acts of police brutality were followed by the
offender being arrested and charged with resisting arrest
along with the original offense.

Chevigny found that acts of

force by police officers often occurred after the citizen
verbally offended the officer (Chevigny, 1969).
^ — /^Police
behavior

on

misconduct
the

covers

street?

various

police

use

aspects
of

of

police

unnecessary

or

unwarranted physical force is only one part of the picture.
Both Chevigny (1969) and Reiss (1973) noted instances were
officers used racial slurs and harassed certain "deviant**
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classes

of

citizens

(e.g.,

drunks,

prostitutes,

and

the

homeless). Also, instances have been observed were policemen
have

harassed

young

(Chevigny, 1969).

citizens

assembled

in

public

areas

The police misconduct dilemma has focused

on the misuse of force because other contentions are usually
harder to prove because they cannot be' easily substantiated,
due to the lack of physical evidence (Wagner, 198 0).
Public Perceptions of the Police

Historically, public opinion seems to present a different
picture of law enforcement than what is suggested by police
misconduct research.

It seems that over time the overwhelming

majority of the public has had a high regard for the police.
A 1966 poll by the National Opinion Research Center found that
only 8 percent of those polled thought the police were doing
a poor job.

Other responses were distributed between fair

(24%) , good (45%), and excellent (22%) . Both the Gallup Poll
(1965)

and the Louis Harris Poll

(1966)

revealed that the

majority of the citizens held the police in high esteem.
Furthermore, the public believed that the police do not engage
in serious misconduct.
believed

that

Commission

of

there

In 1965, only 9 percent of Americans
was

police

Law Enforcement

and

brutality
the

(Presidents

Administration

of

Justice, 1967? p. 145).
fjfc Although surveys show high performance ratings for the
police,

nonwhite

respondents,

particularly

blacks,

have
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consistently rated the police somewhat lower.

The National

Opinion Research Center (1966) found that lower ratings on the
part of nonwhites existed across all income levels and was not
significantly related to socioeconomic status.

The Lou Harris

Poll (1966) revealed that 51 percent of blacks, compared to 67
percent of whites, believed the police to be doing a good or
excellent job.

These public opinion polls also suggest that

citizens below the age of 35,

especially males,

are most

critical of the police— making young, black males the most
critical (Presidents Commission of Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, 1967; p. 146).
7f Current data on public attitudes toward the police reveal
that little has changed since the polls of the mid-1960s.

In

a 1988 Gallup poll, public attitudes toward the police were
relatively high with 47 percent of the respondents rating the
police (in regard to job performance) high or very high. Only
11 percent rated the police as low or very low— the remaining
42

percent

indicated

that

the

police

were

Differences, however, appear when race is examined.

average.
The data

reveal that both blacks and nonwhites in general have lower
opinions of the police.

Similar polls throughout the 1970s

reported similar observations

(U.S. Department of Justice,

1989) . Data throughout the 1970s and 1980s suggests that there
has been

little variation

concerning the police.

over time

in public

attitudes
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Commissions on Policing

Although the public perception of the police is quite
positive, several studies sponsored by the federal government
have found police brutality, or at least the perception of
brutality, to be a grave problem in America.

The National

Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham
Commission),

formed

by

considerable

evidence

President
of

police

Hoover

in

misconduct.

1931,

found

Likewise,

President Truman's Commission on Civil Rights came to similar
conclusions (President's Commission of Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, 1967).
The President's Crime Commission (1967) cited abuses in
some cities which ranged from minor discourtesy to the clear
use of unnecessary force.
officers

treated

It was also found that a number of

citizens

in

discriminatory

employing the use of profanity.

ways

often

One of the Commission's

studies involved 100 routine contacts with citizens in several
different

cities.

The

majority

of

those

interviewed

concerning certain incidents were witnesses, bystanders, or
victims as opposed to suspects.

The study revealed that

around 60 percent of the sample were interrogated without a
proper introduction from the officer,

and 15 percent were

interrogated with derogatory or profane language being used by
the officer (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration

of

Justice,

1967;

p.

180).

The

Crime

Commission also cited the use of racial slurs used against
citizens by the police.
while

police

The Crime Commission concluded that

misconduct

is

not

frequent,

certain

acts

witnessed could not be tolerated no matter how infrequent they
occur

(Presidents

Commission of Law Enforcement

Administration of Justice, 1967; p. 181).

and the

Although the Crime

Commission Report regarding police misconduct and policecommunity relations was structured in a less systematic nature
than other studies (e.g., Reiss, 1971; National Institute of
Justice, 1984), the Commission did affirm a need for police
reform.
fIn ^'report'to the National Commission On The Causes and
Prevention

of

Violence

(1967),

Campbell,

stressing

the

importance of improving police-community relations, stated:
[The “police are, “indeed, prejudiced against
minorities.
And the minority groups are
equally prejudiced against the police.
The
prejudice on both sides is not without some
foundation. The views of each side toward the
other are constantly being reinforced^and have
become self-fulfilling prophesiesPj Doing
something about the problem is what is called
•improving
police-community
relations1
(Campbell et al., 1970; p 299).
The President's Crime Commission
ways

of

improving

police

behavior

(1967) cited several
and

police-community

relations by attempting to make policing more professional.
The

Commission viewed

relations

as

the

betterment

serving two primary

of police-community

functions.

First,

all
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efforts at professionalizing law enforcement agencies would
aid in restoring public confidence in the police— or rather
extending existing public confidence to minorities.

Second,

the commission viewed public hostility on the part of the
police and citizens as detrimental to police field operations.
The Commission stated, "it may make officers reluctant to act;
it may also induce the use of unnecessary force, verbal abuse,
or other improper practices (Presidents Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967; p. 145)".
The Kerner Commission (1968) also reported on the deep
hostility between the police and citizens in American cities.
The Kerner Commission studied civil disorders in American
cities (primarily racial riots).

Many instances of police

misconduct were confirmed, but it was also noted that these
instances do not constitute the normal pattern of police work
or behavior (National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders,
1968).. Again the Kerner Commission restated the conclusion of
the Crime Commission in stating that police brutality,

no

matter how infrequent, is something that cannot be tolerated
(National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders,
160) .

1968; p.

The Kerner Commission relied on studies and surveys

conducted by the President’s Crime Commission

(1967)

and

confirmed instances of police misconduct and therefore cited
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five problem areas:
1)

The need or change in police operations in the
ghetto, to insure proper conduct by individual
officers and to eliminate abrasive practices;

2)

The need for more adequate police protection for
ghetto residents, to eliminate the present high
sense of insecurity to person and property;

3)

The
need
resolving
police;

for
effective
mechanisms
citizen grievances against

for
the

4)

The need for policy guidelines to assist
police in areas where police conduct can
create tension; and,

5)

The need to develop community support for law
enforcement (National Advisory Committee On
Civil Disorders, 1968; p. 158).

The Kerner Commission made a series of recommendations in
the five areas.

Concerning patrol practices, the Commission

recommended that officers with bad reputations among minority
residents be

immediately reassigned to other areas;

that

screening procedures should be adhered to where officers with
superior ability, sensitivity, and common sense be assigned to
minority

neighborhoods;

and

developed rewarding officers

that

incentives

should

for exemplary performance

be
in

minority neighborhoods (National Advisory Committee on Civil
Disorders, 1968; p. 166).

The Commission also recommended the

following objectives aimed at improving police performance:
1)

policies of enforcement in ghetto should be
clear and consistent with other areas;

2)

efforts should be made to distribute officers
according to where they are most needed;
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3)

departments should make efforts to
recruit blacks;

actively

4)

departmentsshould develop policyguidelines
involving the handling, of disputes and
especially deadly force; and

5)

departments
should
develop
strong
investigative
units
to
monitor
officer
compliance with
policies
and procedures
(National
Advisory
Committee
On
Civil
Disorders, 1968; pp. 166-67).

The Kerner Commission made recommendations on the proper
handling of citizen complaints against the police that went
beyond

those

example,

the

of

the

President’s

President's

Crime

Crime

Commission.

Commission

(1967)

For
had

recommended that police precincts utilize city-wide citizen
advisory

committees,

periodically meet

including

with

the

police

minority

leaders,

organization

and

to
that

efforts should be made in handling citizen complaints through
departmental channels that reflect real officer discipline
(Campbell et al., 1970).
more

direct

in

its

grievance mechanisms.

The Kerner Commission was somewhat

recommendations

concerning

citizen

The recommendations were as follows:

1)

Making a complaint should be easy; citizens
should be allowed to file formal grievances
through other community agencies as well as
the police organization.
Also forms used in
filing complaints should be straight forward
and easy to understand;

2)

The grievance procedure should have a built-in
conciliation
process
attempting
resolve
complaint barring a full investigation;
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jr3)

The complaining party should be a participate
in the investigative process and should be
kept fully informed until the final outcome;

4)

Complaints concerning departmental policies
should
be
directed toward
appropriate
departmental units were additional training if
needed can be given; and,

%"5)

A specialized agency, with adequate funds and
staff, should be created separate from other
municipal agencies, to handle, investigate and
to make recommendations on citizen complaint
(National
Advisory
Committee
On
Civil
Disorders, 1968; p. 163).

Both

the

President's

Kerner

Crime

Commission

Commission

complaints system as inadequate.
Commission

had

simply

(1968)

(1967)

as

viewed

well

as the

the

citizen

While the President's Crime

advocated a

reorganization

of

the

complaint procedures to ensure equity, theKerner Commission
believed that an agency independent of the police organization
would be better equipped to handle citizen complaints against
the police.

For the first time a federal commission had

advocated external review of police misconduct allegations
(National Advisory Committee On Civil Disorders, 1968).
Citizen Complaint Procedures
As many studies have shown, American policing has had a
long history of corruption and abuse of authority dating back
to the first decade of
Commission

on

Justice, 1967).

Law

formalized policing

Enforcement

and

the

(President's

Administration

of

By the 1960s, police departments, seeking to

curb the negative aspects of scandals,

began establishing
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special units to investigate allegations of police misconduct.
By the 1970s, most large police departments had some type of
formal procedure or special unit to handle complaints by
citizens— a major recommendation of both the President's Crime
Commission and the Kerner Commission (Klyman and Kruckenburg,
1979? Reasons and Wirth, 1975).
These special units have been referred to as "internal
investigations" or "internal affairs." Internal investigative
units have the task of investigating all classes of complaints
within
involve

the

police

citizens

(President's

organization

or

other

whether

internal

these

complaints

departmental

problems

Commission On Law and the Administration of

Justice, 1967).

Although the police organization has held the

position that police internal investigations provide adequate
means for addressing citizen complaints, many criticisms of
this position have been raised.
Both the President's Crime Commission
Kerner Commission
internal

grievance

(1968)

(19 67)

and the

have cited various problems with

mechanisms.

The

President's

Crime

Commission stated that...."all too often, because of misplaced
loyalty, policemen

overlookserious

misconduct

by

other

officers (President's Commission of Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, 1967? p. 145)." The report further
stated that the police agencies had not developed effective
means by which one officer could openly file a complaint

against a fellow officer.

Another problem addressed by the

Crime Commission involved the reception of complaints within
the

police

organization.

It

seemed

that

many

officers

considered individual citizen complaints as an attack on the
whole

organization

as

individual officer.

opposed

to

an

attack

against

the

Furthermore, in one eastern city, it was

discovered that the police had routinely charged citizens with
filing false reports against officers which generally served
to discourage citizen complaints.

In New York City,

the

practice was to drop criminal charges of false reporting in
exchange for not filing or withdrawing complaints.

The Crime

Commission indicated that these serious considerations made a
mockery of effective means of settling grievances (President's
Commission

On

Law

Enforcement

and

the

Administration

of

Justice, 1967).
The Kerner Commission (1968) stated that a major problem
with internal review was that "founded" cases of police misuse
of

authority

imposed.
matter

rarely meant

that

real

discipline would be

The Commission also stated that internal review, no
how

fair

or

equitable,

could

rarely

provide

the

necessary public confidence or protect the police department
from

clearly

"unfounded"

allegations

(National

Advisory

Commission On Civil Disorders, 1968? p. 162).
To overcome the problems associated with internal review,
some in the criminal justice field began to advocate external
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review

of

the

police.

Although

the

Presidents

Crime

Commission (1967) did not advocate external review, the report
supported

the

contention

drastically

in

need

of

Commission

recommended

that

grievance

reform.
that

procedures

Conversely,

cities

the

establish

were

Kerner

external

reviewing agencies independent of the police department that
would handle citizen complaints (National Advisory Commission
On Civil Disorders, 1968).
especially

those

in

A significant number of citizens,

minority

groups

and

civil

rights

organizations, expressed the most resentment toward internal
review procedures.

These groups (i.e., Urban League, National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP])
became the strongest proponents

for establishing civilian

review boards (Presidents Commission On Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice, 1967).
Civilian Oversight of the Police
Civilian^ review
Washington,

agencies

back

to

194 8

DC created its Civilian Review Board.

cities followed Washington,
review boards, ^these cities
Minneapolis
(1966).

date

(1960),

During

1960s,

Other

DCs lead and established early
included Philadelphia

Rochester

the

when

(1963),
civilian

and

New

review

(1958),

York

City

boards

were

proposed, but not adopted, in Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit,
Los

Angeles,

Oakland,

Newark,

Pittsburgh,

and

Seattle
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(Presidents

Commission

On

Law

Enforcement

and

the

Administration of Justice, 1967; p. 200).
From

the

onset,

civilian

review ^boards

faced

great

opposition, especially from police officers and their unions.
Police agencies questioned the

feasibility of having

lay

persons (without having a full understanding of police work)
(Rogowsky, p

decide whether a policeman acted appropriately
1971).

Police boards in both Philadelphia and Rochester were

subjected

to

law suits

temporarily

disbanded

Philadelphia

Police

wherethe

their

court

permanently

agencies.

Advisory

Board

or

Specifically,

(PAB)

was

created

the
by

executive order of the mayor in 1958 and abolished by lobbying
efforts in 1967.
as

being

a

(President's

Washington DC's board was criticized in 1965

farce and

had

Commission

to
of

be thoroughly
Law

Administration of Justice, 1967).
had

its

of

the board

has

Enforcement

and

the

Although New York City has

Civilian Complaint Review

structure

reorganized

Board

since

been modified

on

1953,

the

numerous

occasions. ^Until 1966 the New York Civilian Complaint Review
Board (CCRB) was composed of sworn staff; therefore, in the
true sense of the word, the CCRB was not truly civilian.

In

1966, the CCRB, after reorganization to include civilians,
was rejected by popular vote, and thereafter was restructured
again

utilizing

Commission

On

only

sworn

Law Enforcement

staff

members

and the

(President's

Administration

of
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Justice, 1967) . The CCRB has since been reorganized (in 1987)
to be composed only of civilians (IACOLE, 1989).
It should be noted that early police review boards rarely
utilized civilians? most often, these agencies were staffed by
command personnel or other sworn officers.

These boards were

created

order

reflecting

public

consensus.

by

political

executive

or

considerations

administrative
more

so

than

Civilian review agencies created in the aforementioned manner
were often doomed when political parties or city leadership
changed hands (President's Commission On Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice, 1967).
The establishment of civilian review agencies seemed to
further alienate the police and the community.

Police unions

vigorously campaigned against civilian review boards and, as
previously mentioned, were successful in disbanding the Police
Advisory Board in Philadelphia in 1967.

At the same time,

community advocacy groups campaigned to extend the power of
\

these boards (Campbell et al., 1969).
These early civilian review agencies differed greatly in
their inception, structure, and the types of cases reviewed,
but they all had one thing in common? #they were only advisory
in nature.

They had no authority to

rather,

recommendations

Classes

of

complaints

were

made

handled

by

to

impose discipline?
the

civilian

polie,6l_ chief.
review

included, but were no limited to, the following:

boards

unnecessary
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or excessive use of force, false arrest, harassment, refusal
to allow the accused to telephone his/her lawyer or family,
indignities, loss or destruction of personal property, denial
of medical attention, discourtesy, and illegal search.

Not

only did civilian review boards handle individual cases, some
reviewed general departmental policies and procedures that
presented conflicts (President's Commission On Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice, 1967).
A change occurred in the mid-1970s whereby many civilian
review agencies were created by local ordinance as opposed to
executive or administrative order (Loveday, 1988).

Ordinances

provide a safeguard because they generally reflect a greater
public consensus and are, therefore, much harder to disband,
requiring a majority of the city council and not simply by
mayoral action.
Relatively little has been written about civilian review
boards.

Most of the literature .is of a historical and/or

descriptive nature tracking the origins of review boards.
Kerstetter

(1985)

made

the

first

systematic

attempt

to

classify civilian review agencies. I-According to Kerstetter
the strongest form of external review is the "civilian review"
model.

In this model authority is invested in an external

agency to investigate, adjudicate, and make recommendations.
Kerstetter labels the "civilian input" model as the second
level of civilian review.

In this model, the external agency

is

given

the

complaints.

power

to

receive

and

investigate

civilian

The facts established by the agency are then

turned over to the head of the police agency.

The third model

of civilian review detailed by Kerstetter is the "civilian
monitor" defined as a procedure by which the investigation,
adjudication, ^and discipline is carried out by the police
department, but an external arena for review is available
p

f m <\

(Kerstetter, 1985).

I

Although

Kerstetter's

terminology

leaves some key questions unanswered.
Kerstetter's civilian review model

is

insightful,

it

For example, in
does the

authority to

investigate and recommend actually mean that it must happen on
every occasion?

Kerstetter's language seems to suggest that

all those agencies with the power to investigate and recommend
are civilian review agencies.

In reality,

some oversight

agencies could be labeled civilian review agencies in error in
that some organizations having certain powers may choose not
to invoke them.

Secondly, the civilian input model designates

those procedures where the investigation is carried out by a
civilian agency and the facts turned over to the police chief.
Although there may be civilian review agencies of this type,
it is more likely that the investigation is actually carried
out by sworn personnel, and then, those facts are turned over
to the external agency to make recommendations.

In fact most

civilian review agencies with the authority to investigate
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also make subsequent recommendations.

Likewise, Kerstetter*s

third model leaves some unanswered questions.
monitor model

In the civilian

investiqation and adjudication is conducted

internally, but there are external reviewing safeguards.

This

category covers procedures where there is an internal appeal
mechanism.

The civilian monitor model is overly broad.

must wonder what type of review?

One

Is the review automatic?

Who makes the judgement as to which cases to review?

In this

model the phrase "reviewing safeguards" is confusing.

If

indeed this model presents a citizen appeal procedure, much is
left to question.
system,

As Kerstetter attempted a classification

other researchers have focused on a more critical

analysis.
Terrill

(1990)

critically reviewed civilian oversight

agencies suggesting that they may well serve only symbolic a
function.

Many oversight agencies, in essence, have no real

independent

function

administrative support.
that

civilian

because

of

lack

of

funds

or

On the other hand, Terrill points out

review provides

a good

checks

and balance .

system; furthermore, civilian oversight may serve as a good
deterrent to police misconduct.
Available research fails to address some key components
of civilian review agencies.

For example, no systematic

effort has been made to provide information on the structure,
functioning, and prevalence of such agencies in the United

States.

However, the International Association for Civilian

Oversight

of

Law

/

Enforcement

(IAQOLE),

a

professional

/

organization of staff members of civilian review agencies,
established in 1984, periodically publishes a compendium which
outlines civilian review organizations in the United States,
England, Australia, and Canada.
contains

descriptive

The IACOLE compendium simply

narratives

classification attempted.

of

certain

agencies;

no

IACOLE uses the term civilian

oversight to mean any procedure whereby civilians review the
facts

or make

recommendations

misconduct (IACOLE, 1989).

in

cases

involving

police

In essence, civilian review and

civilian oversight have the same meaning and are often used
interchangeably.
There are few studies which address the effectiveness of
civilian review agencies and even fewer which examine the
demographic characteristics of cities and jurisdictions where
such agencies exist.

Perez (as cited in Kerstetter,

1985)

attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of citizen complaint
procedures across six different jurisdictions (the San Jose
Odbudman's

Office,

Complaints/Police

the

Kansas

Department,

the

City

Office

Berkeley

of

Police

Citizen
Review

Commission, the Berkeley Police Department, the Oakland Police
Department, and the Contra Costa County Sheriff's Office).
The Berkeley Police Review Commission and the Kansas City
Office of Citizen Complaints were the only civilian oversight
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agencies in the study.

Perez audited a very limited number of

cases in each jurisdiction attempting to uncover the perceived
objectivity, thoroughness, and overall fairness of complaint
procedures.
Data

suggested that the

satisfaction

level with

the

Berkeley Police Review Commission was significantly higher
than the other procedures regardless of the final outcome of
the

case.

The

satisfaction

level

concerning

the

other

procedures were relatively low and were related more to the
final outcome.

In the case of Kansas City, the fact that

investigation was conducted by the police department may have
affected
overall

the
more

satisfaction
comparable

(Kerstetter, 1985).

to

level

making

internal

the

jurisdiction

complaint

procedures

Though the data is only suggestive, the

indication is that civilian oversight agencies may restore
some public confidence in the complaints process.
Research to date seems to suggest that, while public
confidence may heightened by the existence of a civilian
oversight agency, these agencies are less likely than internal
procedures to substantiate police misconduct.

Furthermore,

when guilt is found by civilian oversight agencies,

their

recommendations may be more lenient than that of the police
department (Hudson, 1971).
Although

many

in

the

supported civilian review,

criminal

justice

field

have

none of them have presented a
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convincing argument that such agencies effectively handle
citizen

complaints

against

the

police.

However,

before

significant evaluations of civilian review agencies can be
made, an adequate classification scheme must be established
that addresses the qualitative differences among the various
organizations.

How prevalent are civilian oversight agencies

in the United States, and how can they be distinguished from
one another?

The current project is offered as a basis by

which detailed information on civilian review can be obtained.

CHAPTER 3 _
METHODOLOGY
Sample Selection

In the planning stage of this project, several sampling
strategies were considered.

Probably, the best strategy would

have been to include all civilian oversight agencies in the
United

States,

but

attempting

to

include

all

oversight

agencies would have been an onerous task if not an impossible
one given the limited resources available for the project.
Most

scientific

inquiries

into prevalence

rely on random

sampling or a probability sample, but because of the various
oversight agencies within the larger cities this strategy
would have been inappropriate.

Therefore, the major objective

of the sampling process was to select a good sample of cities
in the United States where prevalence and variety could be
better observed.

After careful deliberation, the 50 largest

U. S. cities (according the Bureau of the Census, 1991) were
selected.

The primary reasons for selection of the 50 cities

were as follows:

1)

civilian oversight agencies are most

prevalent in larger urban areas, and therefore, the 50 cities
would

provide

a

comprehensive

look

at

the

variety

and

structure of oversight agencies, 2) research supports the fact
that the most serious problems of police-community relations
exist in America’s larger cities (President’s Commission of
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 19 67), and
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3) contained within the 50 cities represented are the oldest
civilian

oversight

agencies

in the United

States

(e.g.,

Chicago-OPS, Milwaukee-Police & Fire Commission, and DetroitBoard of Commissioners).
The Survey Instrument

Phase I . A national survey was conducted by telephoning
police departments and/or community advocacy groups in each of
the 50 selected cities.

Respondents (police departments) were

asked to comment on whether or not a civilian oversight agency
existed in their city.

If a oversight agency existed, the

specific agency was contacted for verification.

During the

interviewing process the 1989 IACOLE was utilized as a guide
in designating cities having oversight agencies contained in
the compendium.

In cities where respondents stated that no

civilian oversight agency existed, they were asked about their
respective citizen complaints procedures; this measure was
taken to insure that all procedures could be evaluated more
thoroughly.
In

cities

where

respondents

stated

that

civilian

oversight agencies existed, they were questioned concerning
the specific structure of the oversight agency (e.g., name of
agency,

date established,

composition of board,

who does

initial fact-finding and/or subsequent review, etc.).
of

the

survey

instrument

is

attached

as

A copy

Appendix

B.

Respondents were asked to forward literature on the civilian
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oversight agency in their city.

Data obtained was used to

verify survey information.
The information obtained from the self-reported data was
either verified by literature from the agency/city or by the
1989 IACOLE.

Therefore, all information obtained was reliable

and a valid.
Analysis of City Characteristics

Phase II.

The next step in the project

involved a

comparison of city characteristics where civilian oversight
agencies existed.

Existing data was obtained from the

Statistical Abstract of the United States (1989), the Bureau
of the Census

(1990) , and the most

Criminal Justice Statistics (199 0).

recent Sourcebook of

These data were used to

compare the cities on each of the following variables:

(1)

population, (2) geographic region, (3) racial composition, and
(4) index crime rate.

Table I depicts the method by which the

above variables were operationalized.
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TABLE I

CATEGORIES OF CITY CHARACTERISTICS

POPULATION:
(1)
(2)
(3)

1,000,000 and over
500,000 to 999,999
250,000 to 499,999

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION:
Northeast
Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Rhode Island
Midwiest
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and
Wisconsin.
South
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and
West Virginia.
West
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Washington
MINORITY REPRESENTATION:
(1 )

0 -2 0 %

(2)
(3)

21-30%
31% or more

CRIME RATE:
(1)
(2)
(3)

0-10,000 per year
10,001-15,000 per year
15,001 and higher per year

**Geographic region categories are similar to the ones
used in the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics
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As phase I focused on the prevalence,
functioning of civilian oversight agencies

structure,

and

in the United

States, phase II focused on three objectives: (1) comparisons
among cities with agencies and those without, (2) comparisons
among

cities

different

with

classes

agencies,
of

and

oversight

(3)

comparisons

agencies

underlying patterns could be outlined.

in

hopes

across
that

CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS
Development of a Typology of Oversight Agencies
There

are

a variety

of

throughout the United States.
(1989)

periodically

civilian

oversight

agencies

As mentioned previously, IACOLE

publishes

a

compendium

of

oversight

agencies which contains non-systematic narratives of civilian
oversight organizations. Although the classification system
established

for

Kerstetter

(1985),

classifications
classification

the

current
the

parallels

shortcomings

addressed
scheme

project

more

of

earlier

make

adequate

for

that

of

Kerstetter1s
the

the

current

purpose

of

analysis.
While there are many differences in civilian oversight
agencies

in the United States,

such organizations can be

distinguished from one another by two key elements.
who

does

the

independent

initial

fact-finding

investigation

was

(whether

conducted)?

or

First,
not

Second,

an
who

conducts the review of the facts and makes a recommendation?
With

regard

to

investigation

the

refers

fact-finding
to

process,

investigation

an

that

independent
is

conducted

outside the police organization and by non-sworn persons.
Where investigation and review occur outside the structure of
the

police

agency,

the

process

is most

civilian oversight is at its highest form.

independent,

and

Class I Systems are civilian agencies where the fact
finding

and

subsequent

review

of

cases

alleging

misconduct are conducted by non-sworn persons.

police

The Chicago

Office of Professional Standards (OPS) and the Detroit Board
of Commissioners are examples of Class I Systems by virtue of
the fact that investigation and review in these agencies is
conducted by non-sworn persons or civilians, while at the same
time the scope and power of these agencies vary.
For the purpose

of this

study,

three categories

of

civilian oversight have been established based on key elements
mentioned previously.

The three classifications are listed

below:
\

Class I:

(a) Initial investigation and fact
finding by non-sworn persons; (b) Review
of
investigative
report
and
recommendation for action by non-sworn
person or board consisting of a majority
of civilian persons.

Class II:

(a)
Initial investigation and fact
finding by sworn police officers;
(b )
Review
of
investigative
report
and
recommendation for action by a non-sworn
person or board which consists of a
majority of non-sworn persons.

Class III:

(a) Initial investigation and fact
finding by sworn officers;
(b) Review
of
investigative
report
and
recommendation
for action
by
sworn
officers;
(c) Opportunity for citizen who is
dissatisfied with final disposition of
the complaint to appeal to a board which
includes non-sworn persons.
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Class II Systems of civilian oversight include oversight
agencies where the fact-finding is conducted by sworn officers
(usually the internal affairs unit of the police department)
and a subsequent review is carried out by non-sworn persons.
Some Class II Systems, however, have limited investigatory
powers.

The New York Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB)

and the Indianapolis Office of Citizen-Police are designated
as Class II Systems.

In both agencies,

investigation is

conducted by sworn persons either assigned to the agency or
working within the structure of the police organization.
Class I & II Systems are somewhat easier to isolate based
on the two defining elements.

The third and final category of

civilian oversight (Class III) refers to procedures where both
investigation and review is conducted by sworn officers.

In

these systems, sworn officers also make recommendations after
reviewing the facts.

The citizen may appeal the decision to

a civilian board or agency.
pleas to these agencies.

Complainants make formal, written
In Omaha the Mayor's Public Safety

Finding Review Board hears appeals from dissatisfied citizens.
The Omaha board consists primarily of civilians, although the
police

chief

is

one

of

the

members.

In

Phoenix,

the

Disciplinary Review Board

(DRB) hears appeals and reviews

appropriate

disciplinary

measures

misconduct.

The DRB will also be in this category because

in

founded

there is one non-sworn person on the board.

cases

of

42

There are other important characteristics of civilian
oversight agencies.

Some of these elements will be discussed

throughout this thesis.

Characteristics of civilian oversight

agencies

important

that

are

authorization of the agency,
members,

(3)

method

of

include:

(1)

enabling

(2) number and composition of

appointment,

(4)

type

of

cases

reviewed, and (5) scope and power of the organization.
All but one of the existing civilian oversight agencies are
advisory

in

nature.

They

only

have

the

authority

to

recommend? the ultimate decision on disciplinary measures is
most often the responsibility of the head of the police
TABLE II

CITIES BY CLASSIFICATION

CLASS I :
Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, Milwaukee,
Cleveland, New Orleans, Long Beach, Oakland,
_____ Minneapolis, Honolulu, Cincinnati, Washington D.C.
CLASS II:
New York City, Houston, San Diego, Dallas,
Indianapolis, Baltimore, Portland, Kansas City Mo.,
Atlanta, Albuquerque, Pittsburgh, Miami, Fresno,
_____ Toledo______________________________________________
CLASS III:
_____ Phoenix, Tucson, St. Louis, Omaha____________________
agency, or some other designated public official.
Prevalence

The national survey revealed that the majority of the 50
largest cities had a civilian oversight agency of some variety
(Table

III).

Thirty

of

the

50

cities

have

a civilian
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oversight procedure; the 30 oversight agencies constitute 60
percent of the total sample.
the

30 cities

are

Civilian oversight agencies in

distributed

by

classification

in

the

following manner: (1) 12 Class I Systems (40% of the total),
(2) 14 Class II Systems (46.7% of the total) and, (3) 4 Class
III Systems (13.3% of the total)

(Walker and Bumphus, 1991).

Trends

Compared to the decade of the 1970s, the decade of the
1980s saw a dramatic increase in civilian oversight agencies.
Only 23 percent of the sample cities had oversight agencies
prior to 1980 as compared to the current 60 percent.
77

percent

of

the

current

sample

consists

agencies that were established after 1980.

of

Around

oversight

Furthermore, four

(13.3%) of the agencies in the sample were established in the
199 0s (Table III).

The data clearly reveals growth in the

area of civilian oversight of the police.

The indication is

that the growth in civilian oversight of the police will
continue into the 1990s.
Variety

There

are

great

and

important

differences

in

the

structure and procedures of the 30 agencies included in the
sample.

A discussion of the differences among these agencies

will serve two important functions: (1) characteristics
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TABLE III

CIVILIAN REVIEW AGENCIES
By Year of Creation***

1972 Honolulu

1984 Atlanta

1974 Detroit, Chicago

1985

1975 Omaha

1986 Phoenix, Miami,
Pittsburgh

1977 Milwaukee, Baltimore

1987 New York City,
Albuquerque

1979 Cincinnati

1988 San Diego, Dallas,
Cleveland

1980 Washington, DC,
Oakland

1989 Indianapolis, St.
Louis, Fresno

1981

1990 Houston, Minneapolis

1982 Portland, Tucson

1991 Toledo, Long Beach

1983 San Francisco, New
Orleans, Kansas City
MO.
***Dates represent actual year of authorization for
agency handling of citizens' complaints.

45

specific to each classification will be discussed outlining
inclusion

to

each

category
be

and

discussed

(2)

other

indicating

unique

characteristics

will

variability

within classes.

Each category is discussed separately for a

more focused understanding of civilian oversight in the United
States.

A brief discussion of each classification follows.

Class I . Systems
Twelve agencies in the sample are characterized as being
Class I Systems.

Class I Systems are those agencies where the

initial fact-finding/investigation is conducted by non-sworn
personnel

and the review of the investigative report and

recommendation is made by an individual who is non-sworn or a
board with a majority of non-sworn persons.
Some general characteristics of Class I Systems can be
identified.

The majority of the Class I oversight agencies

operate during regular business hours (although the Cincinnati
Office of Municipal Investigation provides a after hours duty
officer to respond to complaints). In most cities, complaints
are received in person, in writing, on a walk-in basis. In two
agencies (New Orleans &

Minneapolis), anonymous complaints

are received based upon the seriousness of the allegation
(Interview, New Orleans's Municipal Office of Investigation,
January,
Police

11,

1991;

Authority,

Interview,
February

Minneapolis Civilian Review

20,

1991).

Although

these

complaints can be received anonymously, complaints, at some
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point,

must

be

complainant.

reduced

to

writing

and

signed

by

the

Many of the agencies are automatically provided

copies of complaints as a matter of police internal procedure
(neither Oakland nor Washington, DC receives complaints from
their respective departments).
(1) Agency Jurisdiction
All

of the agencies

concurrent

in this

jurisdiction

with

category have at least

their

police

involving those classes of complaints
authority

to

handle.

In

the

above

departments

in which they have
sense,

concurrent

jurisdiction refers to the fact that the oversight agency has
authority to initiate investigation independent of the police
agency, often this may mean that both the police department as
well as the oversight agency are conducting investigations
simultaneously.

The

New

Orleans

Office

of

Municipal

Investigation, the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, and
the Cincinnati Office of Municipal Investigation have original
jurisdiction in cases alleging police misconduct.

Nine of the

12 agencies in this category review only those allegations
filed

against

the

police

department;

two

agencies

(New

Orleans, and Cincinnati) review misconduct allegations brought
against any public employee with the respective city.

The

Fire and Police Commission in Milwaukee reviews allegations of
both the Fire and Police Departments.
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TABLE IV

JURISDICTION AMONG CLASS I AGENCIES

Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission:
All complaints of any type against police
officer as well as general policy and
procedure matters.
Oakland Citizens* Complaint Board:
All complaints of excessive force (original
jurisdiction) Any complaint where a citizen is
dissatisfied (appellate review).
Washington, DC Civilian Complaint Review Board:
Complaints of police harassment, excessive use
of force, and use of language likely to demean
the inherent dignity of any person to whom it
was directed and to trigger disrespect for law
enforcement officers
Cincinnati Office of Municipal Investigation:
Complaints of serious misconduct by any city
employee and deliberate or intentional shots
fired by police personnel. Serious misconduct
involves-bribery, theft, improper weapons
discharge, coercion, excessive use of physical
force, a violation of the law, and any other
action that may reasonably justify the
dismissal of a public employee.
Chicago Office of Professional Standards/Police Board:
Complaints of excessive force and shots fired.
Honolulu Police Commission:
Complaints of partial attitude, discourtesy,
threatening behavior, theft, property damage,
unnecessary force, malicious force, excessive
_____ force and unnecessary use of a weapon._____
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Class

I oversight

agencies

are

mandated

to

receive

and

investigate a variety of complaints that are usually outlined
in

very

broad

terms

interpretations.

and

are

subject

to

many

different

Table IV illustrates the variety in the

jurisdiction among Class I agencies.
All Class I agencies receive as well
complaints.

as investigate

Most of the agencies have original jurisdiction

of classes of complaints which they are authorized to handle.
Nine

of

the

oversight

agencies

investigate

only

those

complaints filed with their agencies by a citizen or by their
police departments?

other complaints not brought to their

attention are not investigated or reviewed by the agency and
remain with police internal affairs.
Police

Commission,

Investigation,
Investigation

the

and
are

New

the

jurisdiction over all

Orleans

Cincinnati

among

The Milwaukee Fire and

the

Office
Office

agencies

that

of

Municipal

of

Municipal

have

original

complaints of police misconduct

as

previously mentioned.

(2) Agency Organization
The

information

in

Appendix

A

illustrates

the

organization oversight agencies contained in the sample.

Nine

of the 12 agencies in this first category are boards which
review the facts in cases and makes recommendations. The three
remaining

agencies

(Cincinnati,

San

Francisco,

and

New

Orleans) are administrative offices headed by chief executives
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who serve the same function as the review boards.

These

administrative agencies consist of trained, professional, paid
investigators

who

conduct

independent

investigations

and

prepare summary reports under the direction of the chief
executive member of the agency. These three agencies differ in
that they are full-time offices whereas the boards, for the
most part, meet periodically.

(3) Agency Powers
In all Class I agencies, the initial investigation of a
complaint is conducted by independent investigators.

One

important component to Class I agencies is that all in the
survey have subpoena powers.

Subpoena powers authorize the

agency to sequester the presence of witnesses during hearings
who are most centrally involved in the issue at hand.

The

assurance through subpoena powers that appropriate persons
involved in specific cases appear before the deliberating body
is

essential

to

disclosing

all

pertinent

information.

Although all Class I agencies have subpoena powers, there is
no consistent pattern
powers.

in terms

of the

scope

of subpoena

For example, only the Cincinnati Office of Municipal

investigation,

the

New

Orleans

Office

of

Municipal

Investigation, and the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission
can assure the mandatory presence of law enforcement officers
at adversarial proceedings.

Most agencies depend upon the
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voluntary co-operation of witnesses, especially on the part of
police officers.
Class

I

Systems

make

recommendations

preponderance of the evidence.
the power to

based

on

a

Only one of these agencies has

impose discipline

(Milwaukee).

There

are

several variations in the form in which recommendations are
made.

Most agencies use the standard terms such as "founded"

(meaning

misconduct

was

found),

"unfounded"

(meaning

no

instance of misconduct was found), "sustained" (meaning some
infraction has occurred), and "unsustained" (meaning evidence
does not prove the allegation one way or the other).

Other

agencies use the terms such as "substantiated",
"unsubstantiated",

"exonerated",

and "unfounded".

Oakland

finds a complaint as either "substantiated" or
"unsubstantiated."

Washington DC's Civilian Complaint Review

Board either "sustains", "dismisses", or finds that misconduct
has occurred (Petito, 1986).

The recommendation made by these

agencies are forwarded to the head of the police agency, the
city manager,

or mayor;

recommendations

are

binding.

the

of

Fire

In

case

Milwaukee's

not

usually

and

Police

Commission, the agency is an executive oversight agency of the
police department; therefore, the determination is binding.
Where

the

Milwaukee's

Fire

and

Police

Commission

misconduct, discipline can be imposed (Petito, 1986).

finds

51

Eleven of the 12 agencies in this category were created
by local ordinance.

These agencies are monitored by the city

council and mayor.

The Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission

was established by state statute making the Commission unique
among Class I agencies.
(4) Selected Class I Agencies
(a)

Introduct ion

Below are brief narratives of three Class I oversight
agencies designed to illustrate the variety of agencies in the
Class

I

category.

Investigation,
(Police Board),

New

Chicago's

Orleans'

Municipal

Office

Office of Professional

of

Standards

and Detroit's Board of Commissioners

are

outlined.
(b)

New Orleans/Municioal Office of Investigation

The New Orleans Office is of Municipal Investigation
(OMI)

was

ordinance.
alleged

established

in

1980

and

authorized

by

local

The Office authorized to investigate complaints of

illegal

or

improper

conduct

on the

part

of

any

municipal employee (IACOLE, 1989).
Presently, the OMI consists of 7 full-time employees, all
civilians.

The OMI has a Chief Investigator who reports

directly to the Chief Administrative Officer of the city.

OMI

investigations are limited to improper or illegal conduct;
therefore,

minor

departmentally.

decrepancies

However,

the OMI

are

handled

inter

is responsible

for the
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routing of minor decrepancies to the appropriate department.
Any citizen except those employed by the agency can file a
complaint with the OMI. The OMI conducts adversarial hearings
and has the authority to subpoena witnesses,
effects.

papers,

and

The hearings conducted are open to the public and

afford both parties the opportunity to present witnesses and
testimony to the board (IACOLE, 1989).
(c)

Chicago/Police Board

The

Chicago

Police

Board

was

established

by

local

ordinance in 1961, and in 1974 the board first began to review
citizen complaints against the police.

The board is comprised

of 9 citizens who are volunteer appointees confirmed by the
city council and brought forth my the mayor.

Under the

authority of the Police Board, the Office of Professional
Standards is empowered to receive all complaints of excessive
use of force and use of firearms.

All other complaints are

handled through police internal investigations (IACOLE, 1989).
Unlike most Class I agencies, the OPS is housed within
the Chicago Police Department,

although the office is not

responsible to the Chief of Police.

The OPS employs all

civilian investigators who conduct independent investigations
and submit investigative reports to the Police Board.

The

Police Board deliberates and files recommendations with the
Superintendent of Police.

The Chicago Police Board hears all
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cases assigned to it by the Superintendent of Police and Law
Department (Petito, 1986).
(d)
The
ordinance

Detroit/Board of Commissioners
Detroit
in

Board

1974.

of

The

Commissioners

Board

consists

was
of

created

five members

appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city council.
Office of the Chief Investigator
authority

of

the

Board

of

by

The

(OCI), acting under the

Commissioners,

receives

and

investigates complaints involving force, arrest, entry search,
harassment, demeanor, procedure, service, and property.
OCI

provides

a

investigative

summary

to

the

The

Board

of

Commissioners (IACOLE, 1989).
The
complaints

Board

in

recommendations

of

Commissioners

the

above

made

by

the

mentioned
Board

of

receive

only

those

categories.
Commissioners

All
are

presented to the Chief of Police for disciplinary action
(IACOLE, 1989).
(e)

Summary

All three agencies outlined are ones where civilians play
a major role in two crucial areas— investigation and review of
the facts.

The OMI (New Orleans) has original jurisdiction

over all complaints of improper conduct involving any city
employee while the Chicago Police Board and the Detroit Board
of Commissioners considers allegations of police misconduct
brought before them. One might argue that the OMI is a much
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more effective agency based on the comprehensive structure of
the its organization.

Others might argue of the OPS that

being housed in the Chicago Police undermines its authority.
Regardless

of

the

arguments

that

may

surface,

the

organizations in the Class I category represent agencies where
there is an independent investigation of the facts followed by
a independent review made by civilians.
Class II Systems
Class II Systems are defined as those systems where the
initial fact-finding/investigation is conducted internally by
sworn officers

and a review of the

facts

is made by an

individual or a board with a majority of non-sworn persons.
Class II agencies make up a majority (46.7%) of the agencies
in the sample.

Since there in no independent evaluation of

the facts, Class II agencies by their very nature constitute
less

of

an

independent process.

Class

dependent upon the police department for

II

agencies

are

interpretation of

the facts.
(1) Agency Jurisdiction
As in Class I Systems, Class II agencies review various
classes of complaints.

Unlike Class I Systems, the types of

complaints seem to involve what many might consider the more
traditionally

serious

allegations.

The

categories

of

complaints in Class II agencies deal with actions that cause
the greatest community controversy such as excessive force,
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TABLE V

JURISDICTION AMONG CLASS II AGENCIES

Civilian Complaint Review Board/New York City:
Complaints of Unnecessary or excessive force,
abuse of authority, discourtesy, language or
conduct which is derogatory of a person's race,
sex, religion, creed, national origin, or
sexual orientation.
Civilian Review Board/Atlanta:
Complaints of excessive force, serious bodily
injury, or death.
Civilian Review Committee/Houston:
Complaints of excessive force, serious bodily
injury, or death.
Citizen's Police Review Board/Dallas:
Complaints of serious bodily injury or death.
Complaint Evaluation Board/Baltimore:
Complaints of discourtesy and excessive use of
force.
Office of Professional Responsibility/Pittsburgh:
__________ Complaints of improper or illegal conduct.______
serious bodily injury, or discrimination of the basis of race,
sex, national origin, etc.
in Class II agencies.

Jurisdiction is much more limited

Table V illustrates the variety in

jurisdiction among Class II agencies.

While there is less

variability in the types of cases reviewed in Class II Systems
(primarily the more serious cases), the structure of Class II
agencies show greater variability than the former
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classification.
Most Class II agencies in the sample have jurisdiction in
cases

involving

police

employees.

Pittsburgh's

civilian

oversight agency, the Office of Professional Responsibility,
reviews cases involving any municipal employee.

In contrast,

several Class I agencies have the authority to review cases
involving any employee of the municipality.

(2) Agency Organization
Nine Class II agencies in the sample employ a board or
committee which reviews an investigative report prepared by
the police department.

Five of the 14 agencies have somewhat

differences structures.

In Fresno, the Ombudsman's Office,

one designated individual, conducts a subsequent review of the
facts.

Likewise, in Albuquerque, the Independent Counsel, one

individual,

reviews police investigative reports and makes

recommendations concerning disciplinary actions. Pittsburgh's
Office

of Professional

executive officer,

Responsibility,

headed by a chief

reviews complaints of misconduct filed

against any public employee and makes recommendations.

In

Miami, the Office of Professional Compliance reviews the facts
of misconduct cases and often makes additional investigation
before making any recommendations.
Citizen

Complaints

executive

director,

(OCC)

in

reviews

Finally, the Office of

Kansas
all

City,

headed

complaints

of

by

an

police
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misconduct

filed

either

at

the

OCC

or

at

the

police

department.
f3) Agency Powers
The majority

of Class

II

agencies

have

no

subpoena

powers. The 1989 IACOLE Compendium cites the New York City
Civilian Complaint Review Board as the only agency in this
category having subpoena powers (IACOLE, 1989).
Recommendations in Class II agencies are handled in much
the same way as in Class I agencies.

After the agency makes

recommendations, those recommendations are then sent to the
police chief, city manager, mayor, or some other designated
individual.

None of the Class II agencies have the authority

to impose discipline.
(4)

Selected Class II Agencies

(a)

New York/Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB1

The New York CCRB is a board composed of 12 members (6
civilians selected by the city council and 6 selected by the
police department). The CCRB was created by local ordinance.
The

Board

is

a

reviewing

body

that

is

responsible

for

reviewing cases alleging improper conduct on the part of
employees of the New York Police Department.
five satellite offices
(Petito,

1986?

p.

The CCRB has

(one in each borough of the city)

26).

The

CCRB

reviews

allegations

involving: unnecessary or excessive force; abuse of authority;
discourtesy? and language or conduct which is derogatory to a
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individual's race, sex, creed, national origin, or religion
(Petito, 1986; p. 26).
Like several other agencies, the CCRB has a conciliation
process for allegations of less serious in nature.
does have subpoena power.
the

CCRB

makes

its

The CCRB

After the case has been reviewed

recommendations

known

to

the

Police

Commissioner (IACOLE, 1989).
(b)

Pittsburah/Office of Professional Responsibilitv-OPR

The OPR was established in 1986 by local ordinance.

The

office is supervised by a civilian assistant chief who reports
directly to the Director of Public Safety.

One other staff

member, an investigator/coordinator, is also a civilian.

The

OPR conducts a review of all allegations of misconduct within
the Department of Public Safety.

The OPR does not accept

complaints phoned in or made anonymously (refer to Appendix
C) .
The civilian assistant chief upon the receipt of the
investigative report makes recommendations to the Director of
Public Safety.
to

discipline.

OPR does not, however, make recommendations as
Recommendations

are

made

based

on

a

preponderance of evidence and indicate whether or not the
complaint is sustained, unsustained,
(refer to Appendix C).

founded,

or unfounded
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(c)

Baltimore/Complaint Evaluation Board(CEB^
The CEB is a seven-member board made up of high-ranking

government officials established by state statute in 1977.
All members of the CEB are agency heads or their designated
substitutes.

Complaints of discourtesy and excessive force

are reviewed by the board.

All complaints must be in writing,

signed, and notarized. The board is mandated to review police
internal investigations and to make written recommendations to
the Police Commissioner.
powers.

The CEB has no formal

subpoena

Dispositions by the CEB include: sustained, dismissed

because of lack or insufficient evidence, exonerated because
of the complainants failure to prove clear and convincing
evidence, and remanded for further investigation.

Complaints

can be taken by any number community agencies throughout the
Baltimore area as well as the Police Department

(refer to

Appendix C).
(d) Summary
Class

II

Systems

are

totally

dependent

internal investigations for the finding of facts.

upon

police

Some Class

II Systems have limited investigative powers; only the New
York CCRB has subpoena powers.
internal

Regardless of whether police

investigation provide adequate depictions of the

facts, there is substantial civilian input involving Class II
oversight agencies.
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Class III Systems
Some

oversight

appellate

level.

agencies

have

Admittedly,

civilian

these

automatic and much less independent.

input

procedures

at

are

the
less

Class III Systems are

those;where both the initial investigation and fact-finding is
conducted internally by sworn officers, but a procedure allows
for an appeal to a body consisting of a civilian element.

The

four agencies in this category are substantially different
from

one

another.

procedures,

but

All

their

the

agencies

similarities

end

represent
there.

appeal

The be£t

approach to describing these agencies is to present a brief
narrative of each.
(1) Category III
(a)

Phoenix/Disciplinarv Review Board(DRB)

The DRB was established by administrative order in 1986
to provide the Police Chief an advisory body to assist him in
giving

stability,

consistency,

disciplinary review process.

and

fairness

to

the

It is within the DRBs authority

to review disciplinary reports, refer such reports back to
unit commanders for further investigation, and recommend the
degree and severity of disciplinary action in founded cases.
The board has the authority to conduct hearings and subsequent
evaluations (refer to Appendix C).
Any employee automatically has the right to appear before
the DRB when an allegation may lead to demotion, suspension,
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or dismissal.
Captains,

The DRB is composed of an Assistant Chief, two

one employee peer,

and one citizen of Phoenix.

Clearly, it is debatable as to whether the civilian element in
this process is significant; nevertheless, there is a civilian
element in the appeal procedure (refer to Appendix C).
(b)

Omaha/Public Safety Findings Review Board

In cases where citizens are dissatisfied with the outcome
a of departmental investigation in Omaha, the Mayor's Public
Safety Findings Review Board is available.

The Mayor's board

was established by executive order in 1975.

In order to

utilize the Public Safety Findings Review Board, a complainant
must submit objections in writing to the Mayor within ten days
of receiving his/her letter of disposition from the Chief of
Police (refer to Appendix C).
The Mayor's board is composed of eight members:

the

Mayor, the Public Safety Director, the Chief of Police, the
Human Relations Director, the City Attorney, one member of the
City Council, and two citizens appointed by the Mayor. The
board has access to all reports filed by the Omaha Police
Department concerning the specific case.

In cases selected,

the Mayor's board may present an alternate recommendation to
the Police Chief for consideration (refer to Appendix C).
(c)

St. Louis/Board of Police Commissioners

As in Omaha, St. Louis has a appeal procedure in cases
where citizens remain dissatisfied with final dispositions.
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The St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners was created by
state statute and consists of four citizens appointed by the
governor and confirmed by the Senate.
filed,

When an appeal is

the Secretary to the Board of Police Commissioners

determines whether the complainant has presented sufficient
evidence to reconsider the case.

In cases where the decision

of the Secretary is that the case was improperly investigated,
it is returned to internal affairs for further investigation.
After further investigation, the Board of Commissioners may
recommend an alternate disposition if justified

(refer to

Appendix C).
(d)

Tucson/Citizens-Police Advisory Committee

The Citizens-Police Advisory Committee was created by
ordinance in 1990.

The committee consists of 13 members of

which two are sworn officers below the rank of sergeant.
members are citizens of Tucson.

All

The ultimate goal of the

advisory committee is to assist the police in achieving a
greater understanding of the nature and causes of complex
community problems,

especially as they relate to police-

community relations and minority groups (refer to Appendix C.)
Although the advisory committee has a number of symbolic
functions, the two functions that justify its inclusion in the
Class III category are as follows:

the committee has the

authority to request that the police department review the
disciplinary actions taken in deciding cases that cause great
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community controversy or discourse.

The committee also has

the authority to use certain incidents and/or dispositions as
a vehicle

for examining police policies,

procedures.

priorities,

and

The Citizens-Advisory Committee acts upon the

direction of the Mayor and City Council.

The committee

usually reviews all cases of a controversial nature and makes
alternate

recommendations

if

they

are

needed

(refer

to

Appendix C).
(e) Summary
It becomes apparent by observing the variety of agencies
in this category that their differences are great.

To what

extent

in this

there

is

an

independent

review

of

cases

category is subject to greater scrutiny than in the previous
two categories.

Class III Systems outline those agencies

where civilians have some input only in the appellate process.
These

agencies

constitute

the

lowest

level

of

civilian

oversight contained in the sample.
Explaining Type and Prevalence

In an attempt to explain prevalence, this section of the
investigation

employed

several

demographic

variables:

population, geographic region, minority representation, and
index

crime

rate.

Crosstabulations

were

run

using

the

existence of a oversight agency as the dependent variable by
the preceding independent variables.

Due to the fact that the

expected cell frequency in all crossbulations was less than 5

64

cases,

no adequate tests

of

significance were conducted.

Differences among categories of 10 percent or greater

(in

cases where a pattern was evident) were accepted as suggestive
and

in

some

cases

relational.

The

preceding

rule

of

association has been recognized as an appropriate one (Babbie,
1989) .
Population.

Utilizing the most current Bureau of the

Census Statistics (1991), each city in the sample was placed
in one of the following population categories:

(1) 1 million

or over, (2) 500,000-999,999, and (3) 250,000- 499,999.

Not

surprisingly, cities with a population of 1 million or over
TABLE VI

CITY POPULATION BY CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
POPULATION BY 100,000
1,000,000 +

500-999,999

250-499,999

%

N

%

N

%

N

NON-CIVILIAN

25.0

2

52.9

9

36.0

9

CLASS I

25.0

2

29.4

5

20.0

5

CLASS II

50.0

4

11.7

2

32.0

8

CLASS III

0.0

0

5.8

1

12.0

3

*U. S. Department of Commerce, 1991.
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were much more likely to have a civilian oversight agency.
Only 25 percent of the cities (Philadelphia and San Antonio)
in the sample with a 1 million plus population had no civilian
oversight procedure.
the

larger

cities

classifications.

Furthermore, oversight agencies among
were

exclusively

in

the

first

two

Although cities with a population on 1

million plus seemed more likely to have a civilian oversight
agency, the data suggested that cities in the third population
category (250,000-499,999) were more likely than those in the
second (500,000-999,999) to have an oversight agency (Table
VI) .
The inference is that when a city reaches a certain
population level the likelihood increases that they will have
a civilian oversight agency.

On the other hand, some cities

with substantially larger populations than third category
cities had no civilian oversight procedure.
Geographical Region. With regard to geographical region,
the findings seem to be most suggestive (Table VII).

Cities

located in the Midwest seemed much more likely to have a
civilian oversight procedure (91.7%) than cities in the South,
Northeast, or West.

Furthermore, 50 percent of the Midwest

agencies were in the Class I category.

In contrast, Southern

cities had the least number of oversight agencies

(31.3%)

percent).

in

There

seemed

to

Northeast and Western regions.

be

no

clear

pattern

the
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TABLE VII

GEOGRAPHICAL VARIABLES BY CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT

AGENCY

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION

TYPE
NORTHEAST

MIDWEST

SOUTH

WEST

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

NON-CIV.

42 .8

3

8.3

1

68.7

11

33 .3

5

CLASS I

14.2

1

50.0

6

6.2

1

26.6

4

CLASS II

42.8

3

25.0

3

25.0

4

26.6

4

CLASS III

0.0

0

16. 6

2

0.0

0

13.3

2

*SourceBook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1990

Minority

Representation,

Minority

representation

included all individuals classified as non-white in 50 of the
sampled cities (the Honolulu minority representation may be
misleading in that the majority of those in the city have
Asian backgrounds).

Minority representation refers to the

composition of the metropolitan statistical area; therefore,
some percentages may be more or less representative of the
actual city population.

The statistical reporting areas were

used due to the fact that the most current information on
minority representation refers to these areas.
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TABLE VIII

CITY MINORITY REPRESENTATION BY CIVILIAN

OVERSIGHT
MINORITY REPRESENTATION
21-30%

10-20%

31% >

%

N

%

N

%

N

NON-CIVILIAN

45.0

9

43.7

7

28.5

4

CLASS I

15.0

3

12.5

2

50. 0

7

CLASS II

25.0

5

37.5

6

21.4

3

CLASS III

15.0

3

6.2

1

0.0

0

*U. S. Department of Commerce, 1991.

Since

minority

citizens

file

more

complaints

in

proportion to their total population than do their white
counterparts, one might expect that cities with substantially
higher minority

representation would

agencies.

findings

The

from

this

have

more

research

oversight

support

the

preceding expectation, with cities with the highest minority
representation having more oversight procedures.
reveals that cities in the third category
more)

were

procedure.

three times more

Table VIII

(31 percent

or

likely to have an oversight
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Crime Rate.

Differences in the index crime fate seemed

to have something to do with whether an oversight agency
existed in a city.

Although both high crime rate cities and

low crime rate cites had a variety of Class I & II agencies,
generally, cities with the higher crime rates had more civlian
oversight agencies (Table IX)«
TABLE IX

INDEX CRIME RATE BY CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
CRIME RATE (ANNUALLY)
0-10000

10001-15000

15001 & MORE

%

N

%

N

%

N

NON-CIVILIAN

47.6

10

39.1

9

16.6

1

CLASS I

19.0

4

30.4

7

16.6

1

CLASS II

28.5

6

21.7

5

50.0

3

CLASS III

4.7

1

8.6

2

16.6

1

*U. S. Department of Commerce, 1991.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Implications of Findings
There has been substantial growth in the area of civilian
oversight of the police in recent years.
seems to be continuing

This apparent growth

into the decade

of the

1990s

as

evidenced by four agencies in the sample which were created in
this

decade.

Evidence

suggests

that

civilian

oversight

agencies have become more stable in that agency creation is
typically by ordinance as opposed to early boards which were
created by administrative or executive order.

One may infer

from the growth in civilian oversight that many jurisdictions
have become more receptive to external review practices.
The variety of oversight agencies across jurisdictions is
very apparent.

Although the established classification scheme

aids in our ability to make generalizations, there remains
differences

among these agencies that must be addressed.

Hopefully, differences among oversight agencies can now be
discussed in respect to a meaningful classification.
The limited descriptive analysis of the variables of
population, geographical region, minority representation, and
crime rate provides suggestive inferences as to the evolution
of civilian oversight procedures.

The strongest suggestions
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from these variables indicate that the Mid-western region may
be

more

receptive

to

civilian

percentages of minorities

oversight

and

that

high

in the population may designate

cities that are more likely to have an external review agency.
However, it should be noted that cities in the sample with
relatively

low

minority

populations

also

have

oversight

agencies, Minneapolis and Indianapolis are two examples of
such cities.
Limitations of Research
This research is limited in that it primarily addresses
the prevalence of oversight agencies.

Selection of the 50

largest U. S. cities as a sample prevents inclusion of other
noted civilian oversight agencies in the country.
oversight agencies

exist

in Rochester,

NY;

Civilian

Hartford,

CT;

Berkeley, CA; Flint, MI; San Diego County, CA; Dade County, FL
(IACOLE, 1989); and, Allen County, IN (Petito, 1986).
Admittedly, the suggestive analysis obtained by looking
at

city

characteristics

in

relation

to

the

existence

oversight agencies provides no statistical significance.

of
The

small number of cases in the sample preempt any meaningful
evaluation of these characteristics (population, geographical
region, minority representation, and crime rate).
The descriptive analysis contained in this thesis only
begins to answer some of the questions concerning civilian
review of the police.

The classification scheme provides a
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good foundation for viewing the variety and structure of
civilian oversight agencies in the United States, but the
research

merely

scratches

the

surface.

Research

must

ultimately focus on some of the more qualitative issues in
this area.
The Need for Further Research

External review of the police was proposed primarily for
two reasons:

to restore public confidence in the police and

to provide an objective means of handling citizen complaints
against the police
Disorders,
account

1968)?

when

oversight.

(National Advisory Committee on Civil
both considerations must be taken

discussing

the

effectiveness

civilian

Is the public more confident as a result of more

widespread civilian oversight?
more

of

into

equitable

or

efficient

Do these agencies provide a
means

of

handling

citizen

grievances against the police?
In order to answer the question concerning effectiveness,
comparative analysis must be directed toward measurements of
citizens* perceptions of civilian oversight.

Public opinion

surveys can answer the question of whether citizens relate
positively to oversight agencies.

Surveys can also be useful

in discovering to what extent citizens are aware of oversight
agencies in their communities.

Are cities making efforts to

make the citizens* complaint process easily accessible to the
public?
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Comparative

analysis

of

complaints

including

investigation, review, and recommendations may be one way of
checking effectiveness.

This type of inquiry should provide

information

both

components

indicating
of external

the

positive

and

review of the police.

negative
Audits

of

significant numbers of citizen complaints across different
jurisdictions would provide information indicating to what
extent there is agreement between the independent agency and
the police agency.
Many of the dynamics of civilian oversight agencies go
beyond simple inclusion into one of the three categories.
Although the current classification system offers insight into
agency organization and structure, other variables need to be
addressed
Research
agencies

independently
must

compare

(i.e.,

respective
statutory

subpoena

to

powers

powers,

classification.
among

oversight

investigative

and

disciplinary powers).
Civilian review of police procedures has seen rising
acceptance in the United States in the last two decades.

It

remains to be determined if these new structures are, indeed,
enhancing the quality of police services or are simply window
dressing to placate citizens.
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APPENDIX B

Name of Department_________________

Date.

•

•••

Person Contacted_____________ ;
______ ■
,
My name is .
Currently we are conducting a national
survey on citizen police civilian review here at the University of
Nebraska in Omaha.
Does your department have a procedure for review of citizen
complaints?
"■

; 7’'""’

' •'

"v

/ : ’P

TP ™

. : XB_a»

.

.

.

.

:

•;

-i.

What is the name of your procedure?

>

What date was it established?.
Where there any prior procedures?

Who does the initial factfinding?

If a board, by what authority
appointed?

If a board,
officers?

is the board

or director

does the board consist of sworn or

non-swom

If a board, how many board members are there, and are full
time, part-time, paid, or unpaid?

Is the specific complaint in question investigated or does
the procedure review only the equity of how the complaint
5Ls handled through departmental channels?

IF HQ. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A CITIZEN HAS A COMPLAINT?
Is. there an internal complaint procedure?

What happens if a citizen is still unhappy?

Is there a review or appeal procedure? (Explain)

*Could you send me a copy of your civilian review
procedure/citizen appeal procedure and an annual report to:
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Department of Criminal Justice
60th & Dodge Streets
Omaha, NE 68182

APPENDIX C

®it« of
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Office of Professional Responsibility

(4121 255-2804

^Ennsylbanta,
F e bruary 6, 1991

V i c Bumpus
U N I V E R S I T Y OF NE B R AS K A
Cr i mi n a l Justice
60th & D od g e Streets
Omaha, N e b r a s k a
68182
De a r Hr.

Bumpus:

Pur s ua n t to your request,
formation is provided.

the following b a c k g r o u n d

in

In 1986, the Office of Professional R e s p o n s i b i l i t y was
formed.
The o f fice is supervised by a civilian a s s i s t a n t
chief who reports d i r e c t l y to the Director of Public Safety.
One other staff member, an investigator/coordinator, is also
a civilian.
Additionally, we have a police sergeant, two (2)
d e t e c t i ve s and two (2) police officers.
As I m e n t i o n e d to you,
we co nd u c t all m i s c on d u c t investigations in the D e p a r t m e n t of
Pub l ic Safety, and also p er f o r m all background checks on
p r o s p e c t i v e Public Safety employees.
This involves appr o x i ma t e l y 1,000 Fire Bu re a u members,
1,100 P olice Bureau M e m b e r s , 160 E m e rgency Medical S e r vi c e
members, 80 B ureau of Bui l d i ng Inspection members, and 250
m e m b e r s in the Adm i n i st r a t io n Bure a u / in c l u di n g d e t e n t i o n o f f i 
cers, i d en t i f i ca t i o n personnel and communications staff.
In 1990, we received a total of 276 complaints (for
all Bureaus).
Of these complaints, 344 were completed (this
includes cases open from the prior year); 72 of the 344 were
closed as sustained (or esta bl i s h i ng that m i s c o n d u c t did o c c u r ) .
Most of our complaints are civilian initiated.
T he y
m u s t be filed in wr i ti n g with this office; we accept no
p h o n e d -i n complaints, nor do we accept anonymous complaints.

1
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BALTIMORE CITY LOCAL LAWS

sa m e manner a s other m em bers of the Baltimore City Police Department. Any*person
w ho is a m em ber of the Baltimore City Police Department shall be given credit for all
the purposes aforesaid for all time spent a s a member of the said Park Police Division.
(P.LL, 1969. s e c . 16-40. 1961. ch. 290.)

COMPLAINT EVALUATION BOARD

16-41. Created; members and powers.
(a) The Complaint Evaluation Board (C.E.B.) of Baltimore City is created to provide
a permanent, statutory a g en cy in Baltimore City through which complaints lodged by
m em bers of the general public regarding alleged acts of discourtesy and e x c e s s iv e
force by personnel of the Police Department of Baltimore City are to be p ro cessed and
evaluated.
(b) The Board is com p osed of the following members or their delegates:
(1) The State's Attorney of Baltimore City

£2) The Attorney General of Maryland
(3) The City Solicitor of Baltimore City
(4) The Police Commissioner of Baltimore City
(5) The Executive Director ol the Legal Aid Bureau. Inc., of Baltimore City
(6) The Executive Director of the Maryland Human Relations Comm ission
(7) The Executive
Commission.

Director of the Baltimore City Community Relations

(c) The City Solicitor of Baltimore City shall be the permanent chairman. The
representative of the Legal Aid Bureau shall serve as secretary.
(d) The Board shall m eet in executive session as often as n ecessa ry to perform its
functions and duties, but it shall meet not less than on ce a month.
(e) In all matters where a quorum is present, a majority vote of the Board shall
prevail. A quorum co n sists of 5 members. (1975. ch. 889.)
16-42. C om plaint p roced u res.
(a) Any person who claims to have been subjected to. or any person who claim s to
have personal knowledge of an act or acts of discourtesy, u se ol e x c e ssiv e lorce. or
injury allegedly resulting from excessiv e force caused by Police personnel, may make
a complaint of su ch conduct et the Office of the Internal Investigation Division ol the
Police Department of Baltimore City, the Legal Aid Bureau, the Maryland Human
Relations Commission, the Baltimore Community Relations Comm ission, or at any of
the Police District Stations.
(b) The complaint shall be reduced to writing on a special C.E.B. Form serially
numbered, signed by the complainant, and notarized before a duly authorized Noiary
Public.
(c) O ne copy of the com pleted form shall be retained by th e recipient ol th e
com plaint and a co p y given to the com plainant. A copy hall be m ailed within 46 hours
to the Internal Investigation Division and to the Secretary of the Board
rdf The S ecretary of the Board shall assign a co n secu tiv e num ber to e a c h

POLICE DEPARTMENT

complaint and. within 48 hours, shall mail a copy to ea c h member of the Board. The
Secretary shall also maintain on file a record of ea ch complaint.
(e)
The Internal Investigation Division shall m ake a com prehensive investigation of
e a c h complaint and submit its report thereof to the Board within 90 days from the date
of the complaint.
(I) The Board shall review the Internal Investigation Division's report and submit in
writing to the Police Commissioner within 30 days from receipt thereof, a statement of
its findings and recommendations a s provided under Section 16-43(b). The Police
Com m issioner shall, within 30 days of his receipl of the findings and recom m endations
of the C.E.B. forward to the Board a statement of his disposition in ea c h c a s e .
Concurrent with this, the Police Commissioner will also forward a Copy of the Board's
recom m endalion and the Police Commissioner's statement of disposition to the
complainant and respondent police personnel. (1975. .ch. 889.)

16-43. Jurisdiction and disposition of complaint.
(a) Jurisdiction of the Board shall extend only to complaints against police
personnel with respect to discourtesy and u se of e x c essiv e lorce a s defined by Police
Department rules and regulations.
(b) Upon review of the investigative report of ea c h c a se , the Board shall make
forthwith any one of the following four recommendations to the Police Commissioner:
(1) Sustain the complaint and approve, disapprove or modify the proposed
Internal Investigation Division's action against the police personnel.
(2) D ism iss the complaint b ecau se of lack or insufficiency of evidence.
(3) E xonerate the police personnel b e c a u s e of the com plainant's failure to prove
his c a s e by clear and convincing evidence.
(4) R em and the c a s e lor further investigation to th e Internal Investigation Division
or to the M aryland State Police.
(c) T he B oard m ay request the com plainant, w itnesses, and the police departm ent
p erso n n el involved in a particular complaint to submit voluntarily to a polygraph test or
lo ap p e ar voluntarily before the Board. (1975. ch. 889.)

16-44. Final action .
The Police Com m issioner h a s final decision-m aking responsibility for the
appropriate disciplinary action in e a c h c a se , but no final action m ay be taken until th e
reco m m en d atio n of the Board h as b een reviewed. (1975. ch. 889.)

16-45. R ights not abrogated.
Nothing contained in this article may ab ro g ate any constitutional, statutory or
com m on law right ol police personnel against whom a com plaint is filed, nor of th e
com plainants, investigalors or w itnesses who participate in the com plaint p rocedure.
(1975. ch. 889.)

GENERAL ORDER NO. B-2

DISCIPLINE, MISCONDUCT AND INVESTIGATION
O F CITIZENS' OCMPLAINIS

2.

I.

(3)

PAGE 7
8/90

If the division ocssmander agrees with the recxamendation for sus
pension or demotion or dismissal, he will forward the report to
the Disciplinary Review Board Chairman, after insuring that the
matter has been fully and adequately investigated, and all per
tinent questions have been answered and documented.
(a)

In those cases when an officer is referred to the Discipli
nary Review Board and the investigation was conducted by the
Internal Affairs Bureau, the officer may request a meeting
with the Internal Affairs investigator to discuss the matter
to be reviewed by the DRB. The officer will not be permitted
to read the investigation nor will any copies be made avail
able for review.

(b) The request shall be made in writing to the officer's im
mediate supervisor. It will be the immediate supervisor's
responsibility to contact the Internal Affairs Bureau
and set a date for the officer, the Internal Affairs inves
tigator, and the supervisor to meet and discuss the matter
prior to the DRB. The officer, if he chooses, may be
acocnpanied by a unit representative.
J.
3.

When the investigation is completed, the accused employee will be
notified in writing of the findings.

DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BTARD: This board is established to provide the Police
Chief with an advisory board to assist in giving stability, consistency,
fairness and timely information to the department's disciplinary process.
The board is authorized to review disciplinary reports, refer such reports
back to unit commanders for further investigation and to recommend the
degree and severity of disciplinary action to the Police Chief. The board
will not conduct hearings or investigations.
A.

The board will consist of an Assistant Chief, two (2) Captains, one (1)
employee peer, and one (1) citizen of Phoenix. An Assistant Chief will
chair the board on a rotating basis.

B.

The board will review ell disciplinary reports in which a suspension,
demotion or dismissal has been approved by a division commander and
ell reports of an employee being cited for driving a vehicle while
under the influence. When an employee is involved in a serious viola
tion of the law or the rules and regulations of the department to the
extent that the violator could be immediately dismissed from employ
ment, a supervisor may immediately and directly refer the matter to
the Police Chief, or his designee, for action. Such a referral will
bypass the Disciplinary Review Board.
(1)

The involved employee shall have the right to appear before the
departmental Disciplinary Review Board when the disciplinary
matters brought before the board may lead to demotion, suspension
or dismissal.
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GENERAL ORDER NO. B-2

DISCIPLINE, MISCONDUCT AND INVESTIGATION
O F CITIZENS' COMPLAINTS

3.

B.

(1)

PAGE' S
8/90

(a) The purpose of such appearance is to give the employee an op
portunity to respond to any sustained assertions made against
him.
(b) The department shall notify the employee ten (10) calendar
days prior to the board meeting. The notification shall
contain the date, time, violation(s), and basis of each
violation that has been partially or wholly sustained.
(c) The employee may meet with his immediate supervisor along
with his second level supervisor, or the employee's bureau/
precinct commander to discuss the matter being reviewed
by the board. The employee may be accompanied by a unit
representative at the meeting.
(d) If the immediate supervisor conducted the investigation, the
employee may meet with the next supervisor in his chain of
command. Such a request shall be made in writing to the
employee1s immediate supervisor. The employee may be accom
panied by a unit representative at the meeting.
(e) The employee may appear before the board, with a unit repre
sentative of his choosing, to state his reasons why the pro
posed action is unjustified.
(f) The employee may submit relevant written matter in support of
his position.
(g)

C.

Any appearance before the board during the employee's reg
ular work shift shall be counted as time worked. Employees
are not eligible for overtime pay when appearing before the
board during other than regular work shift hours.

After review, the board will arrive at a recommendation, including the
number of hours in cases of suspension, and submit it to the Division
Commander.
(1)

Such recommendations are advisory only.

(2)

If the board disagrees with the recommendations submitted by the
Division Camramander, and feels the disciplinary actions should be
less severe than a suspension, demotion or dismissal, they will
return the report to the Division Commander who may proceed with
action as provided under General Order B-2, paragraph 2.1., or
submit the matter directly to the Police Chief for further consid
eration.

(3)

The recommendations of the board will be included in the permanent
records of the disciplinary report.
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CITIES, TOWNS AND VILLAGES
commissioners shall hold office for their term of appointment and until their successors
shall have been appointed and qualified. In case of a vacancy in said board for any cause
whatsoever, it shall be filled by appointment for the unexpired term, in the same manner
as in the case of original appointments. The governor shall issue commissions to the
persons so appointed, designating the time for which they are appointed in case the
appointment is to fill an unexpired term occasioned by death, resignation or any other
cause, and whenever the term of office of any commissioner expires, the appointment of
his successor shall be for four years. The commissioners n ow holding offices under
existing laws in any city of this state to which sections 84.010 to 84.340 apply are to hold
their offices until the expiration of their terms, and their successors are duly appointed'
and qualified.
(Amended by L.1987, H.B. No. €61, § A.)
1987 Legislation
The 1987 amendment modified the terms of
commissioners and provided for apr'0'r,trr<»nts to
fill vacancies beginning on January 9, 1989.
84.040.

Police commissioners— qualifications— term of office— oath— compensation

The said commissioners shall be citizens of the state of Missouri, and shall have been
residents of the cities for a period of four years next preceding their appointment; they
shall, except as specified in sections 84.030 and 84.080, hold their offices for four years,
and until their respective successors shall have been appointed and qualified, and receive
each a salary of one thousand dollars per annum, payable monthly; before entering upon
the duties of their said offices, the said commissioners and the said mayor shall take and
subscribe before a circuit or associate circuit judge of the circuit court of judicial circuit in
which said cities shall be located, or the clerk thereof, the oath or affirmation prescribed
by the Constitution of the state of Missouri, and shall also take and subscribe before the
same judge or clerk the further oath or affidavit that in any and every appointment or
removal to be made by them to or from the police force created and to be organized by
them under sections 84.010 to 84.340, they will in no case and under no pretext appoint or
remove any policeman or officer of police, or other person under them, on account of the
political opinions of such police officer or other person, or for any other cause or reason
than the fitness or unfitness of such a person, in the best judgment of such commission
ers, for the place for which he shall be appointed, or from the place from which he shall
be removed. The said oaths or affirmations shall be recorded and preserved among the
records of the said circuit court.
(Amended by L. 1978, p. 736, § A (§ 1), eff. Jan. 2, 1979; L.1987, H.B. No. 661, § A.)
1987 Legislation
The 1987 amendment inserted “sections 84.030
and” following “except as specified in” in the
first sentence.
84.050.

Board o f police, treasurer— a p p o in tm e n t —tenure — bond (St. Louis)

Ohe of their number shall, from time to time, be appointed by the said commissioners
treasurer of said board of police; and his appointment, when made, shall be certified to by
the clerk of the circuit court of the judicial circuit in which said cities shall be located,
under the seal of said court. Said treasurer shall hold his office for such time as may be
designated by the commissioners, who may remove him at pleasure. Before he enters
upon the duties of his office as treasurer, he shall give bond to thestate ofMissouri, with
one Or more sureties, in the penalty of ten thousand dollars,conditioned for thefaithful
discharge of his duties as treasurer of the board of police, and for the faithful application
and payment over, pursuant to the order and direction of said board, of all moneys which
may come to his hands as such treasurer. The bond of the treasurer shall be approved by
a circuit judge of the judicial circuit in which said cities shall be located and shall be
delivered to and safely kept by the treasurer of said cities.
( A m e n d e d b y L. 1978, p. 73 7, § A (§ ]). e f f. -Jan. 2. 1979.)
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CITIES, TOWNS AND VILLAGES

T itle o f Act:

An Act relating to certain public offices.
L1971, p. 149.

CHAPTER 84. POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN ST. LOUIS
AND KANSAS CITY
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ST. LOUIS
Section
84.175. Police reserve force authorized, powers
and duties— riots or emergencies,
may appoint additional members.
Library References
Municipal Corporations «=181.
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 564.

Cross References
Arrest without warrant on suspicion, see
§ 544.216.
Bertillon system of prisoner identification, see
§ 217.315 et seq.
Criminal records, central repository, duty of
police to report certain information, see § 43.503.
Educational grants, surviving children of offi
cers and employees killed in the line of duty, see
§ 173.260.

W E S T L A W Electronic Research
See W E S T L A W Electronic Research Guide fol
lowing the Preface.

PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ST. LOUIS
84.010.

City ordinances not to conflict with powers of board of police commission
ers— -emergency (St. Louis)

Law Review Commentaries

2. In general
State's retention of control over St Louis po
lice force is legal. Slater v. City of St. Louis
(App.1977) 548 S.W.2d 590.

A Missouri plan for public employee collective
bargaining. Keltner W. Locke, 23 St. Louis U.L.
J. 62 (1979).

3.
N o te s o f D e c is io n s

1. Validity
The City of St. Ix>uis has no authority to
require that officers of the police force, of such
city, hired after a specified date, reside within
the city. Op.Attv.Gen. No. 276, Williams, 10-1672.
84.020.

Board of police commissioners— members— officers (St. Louts)
N o te s o f D e c is io n s

1. In general
Claim against board of police commissioners
for assault and battery and false imprisonment
allegedly committed by three police officers was
84.030.

O rdinances

City ordinance, which is designed to prevent
lead poisoning in dwelling units and which in
effect makes it unlawful not to remove lead
paint, as defined, within 14 days after due and
specific notice is given, is not unconstitutionally
vague on theory' that it does not adequately
describe “nature of the offense charged and
when the violation" occurs. City of St. Louis v.
Brune (Sup.1975) 520 S.W.2d 12.

based on negligent or wrongful performance of
governmental function, and thus was tort action
to which doctrine of sovereign immunity applied
whether board was considered as municipal
agency or state agency. Carmelo v. Miller (App.
1978) 569 S.W.2d 365.

Police commissioners, appointment— term of office— vacancies— (St. Louis)

Beginning on January 9. 1989. the governor of the state of Missouri, by and with the
advise and consent of the senate, shall appoint the four commissioners provided for in
section S4.020, and one commissioner shall be appointed for a term of one year; one
commissioner shall be appointed for a term of two years; one commissioner shall be
appointed for a ter:;; of throe years; one commissioner shall bo. appointed for a term of
four years. Their su'.v-’.'sors shah each be appointed for a term of four years, and saio
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CITY OF TUCSO N
Office of Clfy Clerk

BOARDS,
COMMITTEES, &
COMMISSIONS

CmZENS-POLICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CREATED BY:
Tucson Code, See. 10A-S6 eLseq.
MEMBERS:
13 members: T ie Mayor and each Council Member shall appoint one (1) member of
the Committee. The Fraternal Order o f Police, Lodge N o. 1, shall nominate for
appointm ent by the Mayor and C ouncil, two (2 ) m em b ers from th e Police
Departm ent who hold a rank no greater than serg ea n t. T h e T ucson Crime
Commission shall nominate, for anpointment by the Mayor and Council, one (1)
m em ber. T he Tucson Human d e la tio n s C o m m issio n sh a ll n o m in a te, for
appointment by the Mayor and Council, one (1) member. The City Manger and the
Chief o f Police, or their designated representatives, shall be continuing ex-officio,
non-voting members.
QUORUM:
6 members (must be voting members)
QUALIFICATIONS:
Appointed members must be residents of the City of Tucson and shall not have ever
been convicted of a feiony.
TERMS OF OFFICE:
The terms of the members appointed by Mayor and Council shall be coterminous
with the appointing official or until their successors have been appointed. Other
members shall serve two year terms.

JUL2, 1990
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CITIZENS-POLICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
PAGE TWO

FUNCTIONS:
(a) Consult with the governing body from time to time as may be required by the
Mayor and Council.
(b) Assist the police in achieving a greater understanding of the nature and causes of
complex community problems in the area of h u m a n relations, with special emphasis
on tne advancement and improvement of relations between police and community
minority groups.
(c) Study, examine and re c o mm e n d methods, approaches and techniques to
encourage and develop an active citizen- police partnership in the prevention of
crime.
(d) Promote cooperative citizen-police programs and approaches to the solutions of
community crime problems, emphasizing the principal that the administration of
justice is a responsibility which requires total community involvement.
(e) R e c o m m e n d procedures, programs and/or legislation.to enhance cooperation
among citizens of the community and police.
(f) Strive to strengthen and ensure throughout the community the application of the
principle of equal protection under the law for all persons.
(g) Consult and cooperate with federal, state, city and other public agencies,
commissions and committees on matters within the committee’s charge.
(h) Th e committee m a y ask for and shall receive from the Police Department, a
review of action taken oy the Department in incidents which create community
concern or controversy.
(i) The Committee shall have the authority, should^ it so desire, to use a specific
incident as a vehicle for the examination of police policies, procedures and priorities.

(j) At the discretion and express direction of the Mayor and Council, assume and
undertake such other tasks or duties as will facilitate the accomplishment of these
goals and objectives, except as hereinafter provided.
OPEN PUBLIC MEETING LAW REQUIREMENTS':
This public body, although a subcommittee or advisory committee, has been directed
by the Mayor and Council to file written minutes with the City Clerk. It should be
noted that the minutes filed need not necessarily contain the sam e information
specified under the open public meeting law.
SUPPORTING DEPARTMENT:
Administrative/Secretarial - City Clerk 791-4213/3224

